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Essay · Therapeutic platforms

Converging Ambitions: Alzheimer’s and ALS Therapeutics

Tofersen and ulefnersen suggest that the same gene-targeted technology can be adapted for different rare forms of ALS. Alzheimer’s antibodies tell a parallel story about how a first foothold becomes a therapeutic class.

Anil R. Wadhwani, MD, PhDSeptember 23, 202610 minute read

The news about ulefnersen matters beyond FUS-associated ALS.

The premise

One technology. Two genetic targets.

Tofersen came first. It was designed for ALS caused by changes in a gene called SOD1. Now ulefnersen uses the same basic technology for ALS caused by changes in a different gene, FUS.

Its developers say that, in a Phase 3 trial, ulefnersen improved a combined measure of function and survival compared with placebo. The full results have not been published, so we cannot yet judge the size or durability of the benefit. Ulefnersen remains investigational and unapproved.

But we can already see the larger experiment.

Tofersen and ulefnersen are antisense medicines. Each uses a short strand of genetic material to find the RNA message produced by one gene and reduce production of its protein. Neither permanently edits DNA. Each quiets a particular message.

In SOD1-ALS and FUS-ALS, the molecular address changes. The therapeutic logic does not.

One successful medicine can be an exception. Two medicines built on the same principle for different causes begin to validate a platform.

Why, then, did ALS become a proving ground for gene-targeted medicine while the first disease-modifying treatments for Alzheimer’s disease are antibodies?

Not because ALS is simply genetic or Alzheimer’s simply immunologic. Most ALS cases are not explained by a single known mutation. Alzheimer’s is not primarily a disorder of the immune system.

The answer lies as much in history as in biology. ALS was already an orphan disease before genetics divided it into smaller groups. Alzheimer’s was already one of the most common diseases of aging before its biology could be measured reliably in a living person.

One field became comfortable thinking smaller and smaller. The other needed to find something shared across millions of people.

ALS

ALS learned to work with small numbers.

ALS has always forced medicine to confront rarity.

The United States specifically named ALS in the Orphan Drug Act of 1983. The law recognized a basic problem: when very few people have a disease, ordinary drug-development economics may fail. Treatments need a system that can accommodate smaller markets and smaller studies.

The law did not make ALS easier to treat. It made small numbers a problem to solve rather than a reason to stop.

Genetics divided ALS further. What looked like one disease at the bedside could arise through different biological routes. In some people, a change in one gene produces a harmful protein. Each genetic form becomes a rare disease within a rare disease.

At first, such division seems like the enemy of drug development. How do you build a medicine for a few hundred people, a few dozen, or one?

Genetic medicine can reverse the logic. If the mutation supplies a target and the underlying technology can be reused, rarity also provides precision.

Tofersen was the first major test. It lowers SOD1, a protein that becomes toxic in one genetic form of ALS. Its initial trial produced a frustrating result: the drug clearly changed the biology of the disease, but the short study did not show the hoped-for difference in function.

The FDA granted accelerated approval based on a large reduction in neurofilament, a blood marker released when nerve cells are injured. Longer follow-up has strengthened the case that earlier treatment may preserve function and extend survival.

Tofersen showed that an antisense medicine could reach the nervous system, lower its intended protein, and reduce evidence of nerve injury. Follow-up suggested that changing the biology might also change the course of disease.

Ulefnersen asks whether the method travels.

Its story began with Jaci Hermstad, a young woman with aggressive FUS-ALS. The experimental drug was once called jacifusen in her honor. What began as compassionate use for one person grew into an international Phase 3 trial involving more than 80 participants.

First SOD1. Now FUS.

Two genetic causes, addressed by the same general method. That is the beginning of a platform.

ALS is suited to this test because the field knows how to organize around small patient populations. It has built international referral networks, registries, advocacy groups, and natural-history studies, alongside regulatory pathways for rare disease.

Rarity remains a severe constraint. It also trained the field to build with small numbers.

Alzheimer’s disease

Alzheimer’s needed something shared.

Alzheimer’s faced the opposite problem: scale.

It affects millions. Most cases cannot be traced to one genetic change that can be identified and switched off. Age, many genes, vascular health, metabolism, inflammation, and other forces all contribute.

The field needed a target broad enough to unite a varied population. Amyloid filled that role.

Amyloid plaques had been seen in the brains of people with Alzheimer’s for more than a century. Later discoveries made them more than a visual curiosity. Rare inherited forms of Alzheimer’s pointed directly toward amyloid biology. People with Down syndrome, who carry an extra copy of the chromosome containing the amyloid precursor gene, also develop amyloid changes at younger ages.

Amyloid is not the whole disease. It is, however, shared, early, outside brain cells, and measurable in living people. That last property transformed clinical trials.

For years, trials enrolled people largely on symptoms. Some almost certainly had other causes of dementia. Others had disease too advanced for amyloid removal to make much difference.

Amyloid PET scans, spinal fluid tests, and now blood tests made a more precise question possible:

Does this person have the target the drug is designed to remove?

In ALS, a genetic result identifies the target and the group. In Alzheimer’s, a biomarker confirms that the target is present. Both create precision, but at different points in treatment.

The modality

Why an antibody?

Immunotherapy was not the first attempt to remove amyloid.

Researchers tried pills that reduced amyloid production. Many failed because the enzymes involved also perform other important jobs. Blocking them caused unwanted effects without the hoped-for benefit.

Antibodies offered a different kind of precision. They are recognition tools, designed to attach to a particular shape or form of a protein. An Alzheimer’s antibody can recognize harmful forms of amyloid and help the brain clear them.

This is immunotherapy, but it does not simply “boost the immune system.” It supplies a manufactured antibody with one job. Amyloid sits outside cells, where an antibody can reach it. The antibody can distinguish among forms of amyloid more precisely than a drug that shuts down an entire enzyme. Its dose can also be controlled, paused, or stopped.

That control was learned through failure.

A failed vaccine changed the field.

Before today’s antibodies, researchers tried vaccinating people against amyloid so their own immune systems would make antibodies.

The trial was stopped when some participants developed serious brain inflammation.

Yet examination of treated participants’ brains showed that the immune response had removed plaques. The vaccine failed as a treatment but proved that amyloid in the human brain was not immovable.

The next question was whether researchers could keep the clearance and gain more control.

Passive immunotherapy offered that control. Instead of provoking a lasting immune response, scientists could manufacture an antibody, choose what it recognized, give a measured dose, and stop if necessary.

Success was not immediate. Early antibodies may have targeted the wrong form of amyloid, removed too little, arrived too late, or been tested in people without confirmed amyloid disease.

Each failure refined the recipe. Newer treatments target selected abnormal forms, remove more amyloid, begin earlier, and require evidence that the target is present.

Lecanemab and donanemab emerged from that history.

Both remove substantial amyloid. In large trials of early Alzheimer’s disease, both modestly slowed decline. People still declined. The drugs did not restore lost memory or independence, and they carry real risks, including swelling or bleeding in the brain.

The achievement is narrower than a cure and more important than a cleaner scan.

Two antibodies showed that removing enough amyloid, early enough, from the right people could change the average clinical course. That is why they matter as a class.

The synthesis

The two kinds of precision.

ALS and Alzheimer’s are arriving at precision medicine from opposite directions.

In rare genetic ALS, the precision sits inside the medicine. The treatment is built around one genetic message. The platform scales by changing its sequence for another small group.

In Alzheimer’s, much of the precision lies in matching a standard antibody to the person. Treatment depends on confirming amyloid, recognizing a stage when benefit remains possible, and weighing the risks.

One platform scales by changing the drug for smaller and smaller groups.

The other scales by giving the same drug to a large group that has been defined more carefully.

ALS was already prepared to split. Alzheimer’s first had to find a reason to lump people together, then learn how to split them again by biology, stage, and risk.

A foothold, not a finish line.

Both stories invite exaggeration.

Tofersen’s first trial was difficult to interpret, and the full ulefnersen results remain pending. Alzheimer’s antibodies slow decline modestly while imposing cost, monitoring, and risk.

Calling them breakthroughs obscures their limits. Dismissing them obscures what they make possible.

These are early versions of a method.

The next generation must be easier to deliver, safer, cheaper, and more effective. Genetic medicines must also reach people whose ALS lacks a clear target. Alzheimer’s therapies must address what amyloid removal leaves behind.

But neither field starts from a blank page.

ALS now has evidence that the molecular instructions inside a rare disease can guide the design of a family of medicines.

Alzheimer’s now has evidence that removing a shared pathology can alter the course of disease, even modestly.

What comes next

The paths may converge.

Alzheimer’s treatment is unlikely to stop with antibodies against amyloid.

Researchers are testing an antisense treatment that lowers tau production and developing therapies aimed at APOE, the gene with the strongest influence on common late-onset Alzheimer’s risk. Some approaches aim to lower APOE4. Others aim to add the more protective APOE2.

If those ideas work, Alzheimer’s treatment may begin to resemble the genetic strategy in ALS: identify a specific piece of disease biology, then design a medicine around the message that produces it.

ALS may move in the opposite direction.

Tofersen and ulefnersen begin with rare genes. But abnormal TDP-43 appears in most ALS, suggesting that many seemingly different cases share an important disease process.

TDP-43 is a harder target. Cells need it, and ALS seems to involve both its accumulation in the wrong place and the loss of its normal work. A successful treatment may need to repair those consequences rather than simply remove the protein. If that strategy succeeds, it could reach far beyond one mutation.

Alzheimer’s may learn to split more precisely. ALS may learn to lump more usefully.

From a distance, the original choices can look arbitrary. Why an antibody here and an antisense medicine there? Up close, each reflects what its field could see, measure, deliver, and test at a particular moment.

That is how messy science advances. A disease does not hand researchers a roadmap. Progress begins wherever biology, tools, patients, and history align well enough to make the next convincing experiment possible.

A first therapy does more than test one drug. It teaches a field what to build next.

ALS and Alzheimer’s started from opposite directions. They may converge on the same ambition: treatments built around biology shared by many, yet precise enough for the person receiving them.

Selected references

Sources and further reading.